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Abstract
Weaknesses in investor control over their investments and in warehousing systemic 
risk in modern Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) are the result of a combina-
tion of market failures and of structural flaws deeply ingrained in modern financial 
markets. Yet the utility of complex FMI comprising long custodial chains and large 
global Central Counterparties (CCPs) for the operation of modern markets is not 
seriously disputed. The change in the technology paradigm with the introduction of 
DLT systems for securities and derivatives FMI can increase investor control, the 
efficiency of risk management and, to some extent, augment the distribution of sys-
temic risk. It can thus create a more diverse and resilient financial ecosystem. This 
cross-disciplinary paper identifies a multitude of reasons that favour a paradigm 
shift in FMI technology. It also sketches a comprehensive blockchain-based frame-
work for the development of permission-based platforms for derivatives clearing 
and settlement and the handling of liquidity shortages within DLT systems. Argu-
ably, the impact of technological change should lead to a reduction of industry rents 
for the benefit of end investors and of the end users of finance (entrepreneurs and 
businesses) enhancing market welfare. Therefore, the use of blockchain technol-
ogy in FMI can transform the structure and future direction of the financial services 
industry as a whole.
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1 Introduction
In contemporary financial markets once a trade in securities is concluded the ser-
vices of a number of intermediaries have to be employed to create finality (inviola-
ble legal and material certainty) about the transfer of the asset or cash involved. A 
more complex process is employed in the case of derivatives contracts with respect 
to transaction clearing and settlement, which also involves the transfer of collateral 
to safeguard the execution/performance of the derivative contract concerned. The 
execution of a derivative contract depends on whether the contract is an exchange-
traded derivative or an over-the-counter (OTC) contract. OTC derivative contracts 
can be quite bespoke and flexible as to the choice of underlying assets, maturity, 
size of contract, and terms of delivery. For OTC derivative contracts that do not use 
Central Counterparty (CCP) infrastructure, execution is left to the two parties to the 
contract to arrange. Settlement usually takes place over a number of days. However, 
during the settlement time for the transaction, each party runs the risk that the other 
party may become insolvent or another occurrence may take place so that the trans-
action is not completed (counterparty risk). Where the OTC contract is CCP cleared 
the CCP is interposed between the parties absorbing the credit risk.
Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) arrangements (so-called market ‘plumb-
ing’) are vital for the orderly operation of the global financial system and involve the 
employment of expensive technology and complex technical and legal infrastruc-
ture. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and following agreement within the G20, 
the centralisation of OTC derivatives’ clearing and settlement became one of the 
centrepieces of reform legislation1 to battle systemic risk. This was linked in the 
case of OTC markets to, first, the contagion emanating from the possible string of 
defaults suffered by derivatives counterparties in the event of a crisis when collateral 
becomes scarce, secondly, the formation of invisible links of interconnectedness in 
OTC markets between different market actors and segments, and, third, the risk of 
firesales, generated by stressed traders trying to squeeze cash to meet margin calls to 
avoid default.2
Under the new regulations the central counterparty will be notified of the contract 
and take the place of the trading counterparties by means of legal novation. As a 
result, the bilateral contract is replaced by two opposing contracts with the counter-
party. The CCP provides protection to non-defaulting members (and, indirectly, their 
clients) from the inability of a defaulting member to meet its obligations.3
CCPs use a number of risk mitigation techniques including high scale netting to 
compress open positions to, in principle, manageable chunks of risk. In addition, 
other arrangements are in place to mitigate CCPs’ exposure and the possibility of 
1 Title VII and Title VIII of the Dodd-Franck Act (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173) and the EU Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Regulation (EU) 
No. 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1-59.
2 Avgouleas (2012), ch. 2.
3 See ASX Clearing Party Limited, Clearing Participant Default—An Overview, p 3, available at https 
://www.asx.com.au/docum ents/clear ing/13100 1_Defau lt_Manag ement _-_Publi c_Infor matio n_Docum 
ent_v2.pdf. Accessed 10 January 2019).
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failure including a dynamic process for the provisioning of open positions through 
high grade collateral, so-called margins.4 Then, members’ pre-funded commitments 
and a chunk of CCP owners’ equity can be employed to absorb losses.
The current FMI for both securities and derivatives trading and settlement gives 
rise to a number of social costs. In the case of securities, a chain of custodians hold 
in a sequence the dematerialised security which investors control only indirectly. 
Namely, asset dematerialisation and fungibility has led to the creation of so-called 
intermediated securities which might have improved system efficiency by increasing 
liquidity but have also given rise to a number of undesirable consequences. These 
may be summarised as follows: (a) loss of control over the security by the end of 
the investor/ultimate owner, (b) possible legal uncertainty, and (c) the risk that col-
lateral re-use can induce credit creation through the repo markets and other channels 
for secured funding, which, ultimately may become a systemic concern, especially 
under conditions of generalised illiquidity.5 In the case of OTC derivatives markets, 
risk concentration within central counterparties gives rise to systemic risk concerns, 
especially in the event of a CCP failure.
Regulation has no clear answer for many of these challenges. In the case of the 
mandatory centralisation of OTC derivatives clearing and settlement, regulation has 
given rise to unintended consequences. On the other hand, in recent years the emer-
gence of blockchain-based platforms with more sophisticated features, including 
permission-based systems for the transfer and trading of cryptoassets, have raised 
the prospect of using the underlying technology to address some of the social costs 
associated with contemporary securities and derivatives trading and clearing and 
settlement. The blockchain technology used by systems like the Ethereum platform 
or Ripple6 meaningfully evolved the technology that underlined the Bitcoin block-
chain. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has already been reliably introduced in 
the trade finance environment with significant expected gains in terms of time and 
the transaction costs of document processing.7 In addition, two major international 
securities exchanges have also declared their intention to eventually move to a fully 
blockchain operated trading and clearing environment.8
Given the fact that the industry either experiments on a large scale or has moved 
to implement the new technology, this article postulates that this is the right time 
to consider the eventual benefits and some of the risks of the introduction of block-
chain technology for securities and especially derivatives clearing and settlement. It 
also identifies the essential decision-making and risk-management techniques that 
will make such a transition credible. One of the most important and least discussed 
aspects of the expected change from the introduction of blockchain technology is 
4 For an overview see Pirrong (2009).
5 Gorton and Metrick (2009).
6 For more information see https ://rippl e.com.
7 See ‘Hong Kong regulator, banks launch blockchain-based trade finance platform’, Reuters.com, 17 
July 2018; Ian Allison, ‘Banks Take sides as blockchain trade finance race heats up’, 17 July 2018, avail-
able at https ://www.coind esk.com/banks -take-sides -as-block chain -trade -finan ce-race-heats -up/.
8 These are the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX 2018) and the Canadian Securities Exchange (CSE 
2018).
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that it will significantly transform risk management and risk distribution techniques 
within the financial system while offering investors more control over their invest-
ments and the clearing and settlement process. Thus, this article is undertaking an 
exploratory discussion of how such a transformation could impact on risk diversi-
fication and whether it could act as a restraining force on excessive speculation. In 
Sect. 5 below we offer a first principles solution on how the DLT technology could 
work in a derivatives trading, clearing and settlement environment, especially as 
regards margin calls.
Assuming network effects for DLT platforms, due to higher transparency and 
lower transactions costs, deep pools of liquidity would be reallocated. DLT systems 
would be likely to attract relatively more standardised OTC derivatives contracts, 
which will be easy and cheap to manage during the lifetime of product and clear, 
or tailor-made yet not excessively risky contracts, which the increased transparency 
of blockchain systems and the employment of sophisticated algorithms may make 
easier to price. At the same time, it is not envisaged that CCPs will cease to exist but 
rather that they will operate in order to clear and absorb risks from the more com-
plex and risky end of the derivatives market, a service for which they will charge 
higher fees. And while any such development could make CCPs more risky, at the 
same time the possible existence of several competing systems to clear OTC deriva-
tive markets contracts would turn CCPs to much less important warehouses of sys-
temic risk and thus making them easier to resolve. This would alleviate one of the 
thorniest problems of global finance since big cross-border CCPs are often regarded 
as being, in practice, Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) in the highest order.9
Finally, if reduced volumes meant less loss-absorption capacity for CCPs to clear 
highly complex and risky derivatives, CCPs would simply decline to accept such 
products for clearing. CCPs’ reasoned decision to decline accepting a product for 
clearing could send a strong message to the market and the boards of institutional 
investors that trading in such normally highly speculative products ought to be aban-
doned, unless doing so is absolutely necessary for hedging purposes.
Accordingly, this article argues that the change in the trading, clearing and set-
tlement technology will lead to the creation of uncorrelated clusters of risk through 
a new generation of DLT-operated liquidity and risk pools that will compete with 
CCPs for the clearing and settlement business. And while the platform itself will 
operate on the basis of margin requirements including margin variations/calls and 
a guaranty fund, a so-called treasury, liquidity management on such a platform may 
become more efficient than within CCPs. This may be the case either as a result of 
increased transparency and better pricing but also due to the (discussed in Sect. 7) 
possibility of equipping the platform with a special functionality that could activate 
extraordinary liquidity management mechanisms.
9 E.g., a recent IMF paper notes: ‘[T]he combination of mandatory clearing and concentration of coun-
terparty risk into a central infrastructure increases the risk of failure of the infrastructure itself. This 
issue arises for the largest CCPs, which clear OTC derivative products in accordance with the new man-
dates…’ Singh and Turing (2018), p 4. For CCP resolution standards see Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
(2017d).
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While it is very hard to predict the level of market and risk transformation that 
DLT systems will bring in the future, their increased fidelity and reliability means 
that the present push by global regulators for further centralisation which leads to 
stronger levels of CCP concentration is misguided. But the benefits that the new 
technology may bring to ecosystem resilience may not materialise if regulators help 
CCPs to simply strengthen their position by hijacking the new technology and mak-
ing it to serve their ends, as they are, of course, capable of doing.
This article is divided into seven sections including the present introduction. Sec-
tion 2 offers an analytical overview of the key functions of CCPs and the risk miti-
gation mechanisms they employ leading, in principle, to the containment of clear-
ing and settlement risk. Section  3 will discuss the challenges that CCPs raise for 
the orderly function and stability of the financial system. Section 4 focuses on risk 
spillovers from CCPs that can trigger a systemic event. These may emanate from the 
possible inadequacy of key loss absorption mechanisms and/or interconnectedness. 
Section 5 explains how a DLT system for derivatives trading, clearing and settle-
ment could be configured/built and the mechanisms advanced blockchain systems 
can employ which could alleviate risk concentration in financial markets. Section 6 
explains how the employment of DLT systems empowers investors and reduces the 
risks to the financial system from uncontrollable collateral re-use. Section 7 brings 
the different strands of the present enquiry into a comprehensive conclusion.
2  Central Counterparties: Risk Mitigation Techniques
2.1  Benefits of Centralised Clearing and CCP Operations
Clearinghouses (CCHs) are a risk management mechanism which enables a mar-
ket-wide pooling of post-trading liquidity. Becoming the transactional node for all 
cleared trades and accessing the information about all cleared transactions, the clear-
inghouse can assess, price, and monitor risks in the market. The collateralisation of 
derivatives transactions reduces the amount of credit (leverage) implicit in deriva-
tives trades and mutualization (member risk sharing) and equitization (shareholder 
absorption of losses) shift default losses to the members and (to a lesser extent) the 
owners of the CCP. In addition, CCPs implement a variety of measures, including 
auctions to reduce and reallocate the losses resulting from the default of a mem-
ber. In this way CCPs can reduce disruptions associated with the replacement of 
defaulted positions.10
Most CCPs were originally created by the members of futures exchanges to serve 
the members’ interests by allocating and managing default risk more efficiently. But 
in contrast to their present conception, CCPs were not designed as macro-prudential 
institutions with responsibility to improve the safety and soundness of the broader 
10 Among the many sources cited in this article there are three key papers on which the section draws on 
more than others and they are Pirrong (2011); Elliott (2013); Carter and Garner (2015).
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financial system.11 The systemic importance of CCPs has dramatically expanded as 
a result of Dodd-Frank, EMIR, and other regulatory initiatives around the world that 
mandate the clearing of derivatives contracts. CCPs contribute to the stability of the 
financial system in many critical ways.12
2.2  Margin Collections
One of the most important risk management functions that CCPs have is the (accu-
rate) valuation of the derivatives positions to be cleared. Since trading parties’ expo-
sures become CCP exposures after the aforementioned novation process, CCPs 
demand collateral (or ‘margin’) from the trading counterparties. Collateral collected 
as margin serves an important risk mitigation function and it is employed as the 
first line of defence against counterparty risk13 regardless of whether the contract is 
cleared bilaterally or centrally via a CCP.
The collection of margin by the clearing member from its clearing customers for 
each trade takes place at the initiation of the trade (initial margin) and on a regu-
lar basis (variation margin) for the lifetime of the contract. Variation margin is col-
lected at least daily, but frequently intra-day, based on changes in prices since the 
last mark-to-market calculation, when CCPs calculate the gains and losses on each 
portfolio. Those whose contracts have declined in value as a result of these price 
changes are obligated to transfer collateral to the CCP of an amount equal to this 
change in market value. This is a variation margin payment.
CCPs set initial margin amounts and the frequency of mark-to-market to contain 
loss from a cleared position which also reflect CCP estimates of the riskiness of 
the underlying transaction. On the other hand, while initial margins refer to contract 
riskiness, they do not cover the creditworthiness of the party to a trade.
In principle, initial margins and variation margins should be sufficient to cover 
the defaulter’s obligations. But the ‘defaulter pays’ model may never be fully appli-
cable. Because margins are costly,14 it is inefficient to collateralize contracts against 
all possible price movements. Derivatives traders normally trade on credit and the 
security (collateral) they provide is merely a fraction of the value of any given con-
tract. Accordingly, through their choice of margin levels, CCPs tailor not just their 
exposures to losses resulting from default but also traders’ leverage.15 As deriva-
tives traders often have to borrow some of the additional funds or the securities that 
are required to post as collateral, liquidity might dry up or funding costs and yields 
might increase, thereby making the choice between borrowing at substantial higher 
costs and default a stark one. We discuss funding risk in Sect. 4 below.
14 Hartzmark (1986), S147.
15 Pirrong (2011), p 3.
11 For the systemic concerns raised in connection with the possible failure futures CCPs in the US dur-
ing the 1987 crash see Bernanke (1990), p 133.
12 See for discussion Kroszner (2011).
13 Pirrong (2011), p 25.
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2.3  Netting, Contract Replacement and Auctions
Netting of offsetting positions as well as netting of exposures across contracts can 
be a rather effective risk mitigation exercise as it reduces the exposure of contracts 
at risk of default and of the amounts at risk upon default. Given the centralisation of 
opposite positions and exposures through the centralisation of clearing, CCPs are in 
a much better position to make netting an effective risk-reduction mechanism than 
would happen in a bilateral clearing scenario. In addition, netting of positions across 
multiple parties reduces the total positions that need to be replaced in the event of 
default, which tends to mitigate price impact.
The benefits of netting, however, also depend on the scale and scope of CCPs in 
a way that encourages uniformity/standardisation and concentration, since for every 
derivatives contract, position opportunities are maximized when a single CCP clears 
the specific product.16
Also CCPs facilitate the orderly transfer of customer positions from financially 
troubled intermediaries or their orderly replacement through a number of mecha-
nisms including via auctioning off the defaulter’s contractual obligations. Since CCP 
rules allow customer positions to be portable, these can be transferred from the cli-
ent accounts of a troubled CCP member (held with the CCP) to financially sound 
member firms. This reduces the likelihood that a defaulter’s clients will lose as a 
result of the default or that their margin money or assets will be encumbered as part 
of the bankrupt member’s estate.
Moreover, centralised CCP auctions for defaulted contracts do not just absorb 
risk on defaulted contracts, they can also contain price disruptions.17 Naturally, 
well-managed centralized auctions among CCP members can be more liquid than ad 
hoc ones, and result in lesser price disruptions. This is particularly important during 
periods of pronounced uncertainty in the market as liquidity pooled within the CCP 
can avert the risk of firesales.
2.4  Risk Equitisation and Mutualisation
CCPs use members’ pre-committed resources and owners’ equity as a countercy-
clical risk absorption buffer allowing them to perform a macroprudential function 
in containing systemic risk alongside the risk management techniques discussed 
above. The built-in ex ante loss absorption capacity can, in principle, contain the 
risk of contagion especially if the resources pooled in the guaranty fund and the 
CCP’s equity are substantially higher than those of a single firm and control the risk 
of intra-firm contagion for CCP members. This is especially the case where market 
risks in one segment of a firm’s balance sheet can become solvency risks if a wor-
ried market declines to refinance the firm’s debt, or act as a counterparty for trans-
actions taking place in another segment of the firm’s balance sheet. At the same 
16 Pirrong (2006); Duffie and Zhu (2011).
17 Pirrong (2011), p 10.
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time, the CCP strengthens the contractual links among clearing members and clear-
ing members and the CCP giving rise to a different source of contagion risk due to 
interconnectedness.
CCPs typically require their member firms to make contributions to a default 
fund (or its equivalent). In this way, default losses are shared—mutualized—among 
the CCP members. Losses in excess of those covered by the defaulter’s margin and 
default fund contribution are drawn from the general default fund. If losses exhaust 
the fund, CCPs typically obligate the members to make additional contributions. 
These additional contributions (capital calls) may be capped at an amount equal to 
the original contribution to the CCP default fund18 and they are part of the so-called 
‘loss waterfall’.19 Because of these specific features, the clearinghouse can perform 
a macroprudential function in mitigating systemic risk: the countercyclical nature 
of the fund reduces the likelihood of contagion. In some cases, the CCH owner may 
intervene after CCP’ resources including margins and contributions to the guaranty 
fund have been depleted.
CCHs are today for-profit corporations, or subsidiaries of for-profit corporations. 
This poses a number of governance problems since shareholders may be tempted 
to accept for clearance higher risk products which may increase revenue and thus 
shareholder profit. Namely, since it is the member’s pre-funded commitments that 
will take the first hit in the event of failure, shareholders and their directors may 
feel tempted to undertake unnecessary risks. This perverse agency problem is to 
some extent mitigated by the fact shareholders’ equity can be used to absorb default 
losses, so-called skin-in-the-game.20
3  CCP Governance, Moral Hazard and Risk Concentration
3.1  Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and CCP Governance
3.1.1  Adverse Selection
CCP reallocation of risk can improve welfare by shifting risk from those who bear 
it at a high cost to those who can bear it at a lower cost. Critically, since all pro-
tection mechanisms have costs arising from information and incentive problems—a 
good example here is the moral hazard and adverse selection associated with deposit 
insurance or credit default swaps (CDs)—clearing of derivatives trades via CCPs 
is not an exception. As firms that trade derivatives know more about the risks of 
particular products than the CCP, these firms tend to over-trade the products for 
which the CCP underestimates risk, and under-trade the products for which the CCP 
overestimates risk. Many firms trading derivatives (e.g., large banks, hedge funds) 
18 Pirrong (2011), p 9.
19 Singh and Turing (2018), pp 5–6.
20 Saguato (2017).
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specialize precisely in understanding these risks,21 and hence are likely to have bet-
ter information than CCPs and this is especially true for more complex and novel 
derivative instruments.
CCP members can, in fact, engage in this behaviour with relative impunity. One 
of the benefits of clearing, the fact that it makes cleared instruments fungible by 
making all potential counterparties interchangeable, also tends to reduce the costs 
that riskier firms incur to trade relative to the costs incurred by lower risk firms.22 
And while CCPs monitor the creditworthiness of their members, this monitoring is 
largely based on standards and information (e.g., accounting statements) that do not 
reflect, in a timely manner, the changes in the creditworthiness of their members. 
Thus, close monitoring by the CCP only imperfectly controls moral hazard associ-
ated with the trades of riskier firms.23
3.1.2  CCP Governance
CCHs were first formed as transaction cost-saving clubs where risks were pooled 
and shared among CCH members who were also the owners of the organisation. 
However, with the advent of the demutualisation of financial exchanges in the 2000s, 
CCHs became parts of larger financial market infrastructure groups in a process of 
the vertical integration of trading, post-trading, and reporting services.24 The four 
most important derivatives clearing houses are all subsidiaries or internal divisions 
of publicly listed parent companies which are run to maximize shareholder value 
providing reduced or no management rights to their members. Given the corporate 
structure of modern CCHs, agency problems as regards the calibration of CCPs’ risk 
appetite are quite endemic and are a cause of wider concern, since the more products 
they clear the higher the profit accruing to CCH shareholders.
One solution that could deal with CCP governance issues is ring-fencing, a tech-
nique used to shield one entity from risks originating in other parts of a business 
group or markets. The best example is the UK’s initiative to ring-fence its commer-
cial banks from the investment banking risks undertaken by other entities/divisions 
of the banking group.25 But ring-fencing may also present its own problems, since 
it would allow those CCHs that today contribute their own resources to absorb CCP 
residual losses, when all other sources of funding through the loss waterfall have 
been exhausted, to withdraw such support. It will also make CCP membership more 
expensive, since the prospect of operating efficiencies across the CCH divisions and 
the cross-use of IT infrastructure, a form of cross-subsidisation of group functions, 
would disappear.
21 Telser (1981), p 1.
22 See Pirrong (2010); Pirrong (2011).
23 Pirrong (2011), p 14.
24 Ferrarini and Saguato (2015), p 285.
25 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 c. 33.
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3.2  Prudential Controls: Regulatory Checks on CCPs’ Decision‑Making 
and Stress‑Testing
The adverse selection and governance problems associated with CCPs are to some 
extent mitigated by regulation which sets out prudential rules and risk management 
standards for CCPs, especially vis-à-vis margins, the guaranty fund and default 
waterfalls. These rules extend from establishing risk committees at the CCP level to 
international standards on liquidity lines and financial resources to address liquidity 
and solvency risk,26 and regular stress tests.27
Yet in spite of such prudential controls and especially the introduction of robust 
CCP stress testing, which have already identified the insufficiency of resources in 
extreme scenarios,28 the problems of containing and modelling CCP riskiness 
remain. Risk modelling is of critical importance when it comes to calibrating the 
guaranty fund contributions and the waterfall to avoid CCP failures.29 Roma Cont 
argues that:
Due to cross-membership of large financial across multiple CCPs and interop-
erating agreements between CCPs, isolated stress tests of single CCPs do not 
provide an accurate picture of losses in the event of the default of one or more 
clearing members.30
Therefore, a realistic assessment of the systemic risk associated with the failure 
of a clearing member calls for a stress test which accounts for the interconnected-
ness of different CCPs and their clearing members.31 Another obstacle with CCP 
stress testing is of course the fact that supervisors have extensive experience in bank 
stress testing and tend to treat CCPs as if they were banks, even though CCPs tackle 
entirely different (and often less diverse) types of risk and unlike banks they do not 
employ shareholders’ capital as a key cushion against losses.32
3.3  Industry Concentration and Risk Spillovers
CCPs today have strong natural monopoly characteristics which decisively influ-
ence the structure of and competition within the clearing sector. This explains why 
the global marketplace is dominated by a very small number of large CCPs which 
tend to be highly systemically important. The view that there is a trade-off between 
26 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, the Board of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO) (2012).
27 ESMA (2018); Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, the Board of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO) (2018).
28 E.g., ESMA (2018). Dan Hardie of risk.net notes: ‘Small increases to stress-test scenarios would have 
left Ice Clear Europe “in material breach”’. Hardie (2018)
29 Two very important studies highlighting this problem are Cont (2015) and Armakolla and Laurent 
(2017).
30 Cont (2015), p 27.
31 Ibid., p 28.
32 See Cox and Steigerwald (2017).
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competition and systemic stability is nothing new and also pervades the banking 
sector literature.33 But even so, post-2008 regulation, if anything, strongly reinforced 
barriers to entry shoring up the competitive position of the very small number of 
CCHs/CCPs that dominate the global industry for financial market infrastructure 
services.
CCPs are important inter-connectors in the financial system and are thus likely to 
be systemically important financial institutions. The failure of a large CCP can have 
potentially catastrophic consequences. And if the direct financial stability risks that 
such a concentration entails were not enough, the threat to the global disruption of 
the supply of clearing and settlement services34 or even a disruption in the opera-
tions of CCPs themselves,35 an unlikely but not impossible scenario, is too big to 
contemplate.
We discuss the problem of CCP and member interconnectedness in Sect. 4 below. 
It is sufficient to say here that possibly the only drastic (albeit long-term) remedy 
to the massive risks that CCP concentration poses is investment to accelerate the 
change of the technological paradigm so that CCPs become less systemically impor-
tant/too-big-to-fail. Namely, the need to shift to a different technology paradigm 
may not be separated by clear concerns that show that big global CCPs are massive 
depositaries of systemic risk and a source of TBTF type of moral hazard.
3.4  Standardization, Complexity and Liquidity
The standardization of contract terms facilitates clearing in several ways. Most 
CCPs specialise in clearing specific asset classes which, on the one hand, facilitates 
post-trading/clearing liquidity, while, on the other, creates homogeneity of CCP 
exposures and a higher degree of industry concentration.
But the mandatory clearing of complex products creates risks for CCPs, since 
specialised firms have superior expertise in complex contracts putting CCPs at an 
information disadvantage vis-à-vis their members exacerbating the adverse selec-
tion problem. To resolve the issue of pricing the CCP will resort to either overcol-
lateralization due to product underpricing or undercollateralisation, including lower 
than required initial margins, due to product overpricing. In the first case the CCP 
deprives the market of useful liquidity. In the second it remains under-protected 
against product risk.
Price information problems can be mitigated by prudent CCP policies. Still, prod-
uct liquidity and pricing information, especially when it comes to complex products, 
will be very hard to obtain during periods of market stress due to a wider crisis and 
CCPs can find themselves badly exposed in the event of a member’s default.
33 Ratnovksi (2013); Avgouleas (2016b).
34 Financial Stability Board (2018), p 4. See also Financial Stability Board (2017a), p 3.
35 Ibid.
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4  CCPS and Systemic Risk
The key and often overlapping risks associated with CCPs tend to fall within four 
broad categories: (a) funding-liquidity shocks relating to both the supply of cash 
and collateral that spiral out of control; (b) the failure of critical CCP operations; 
(c) the failure of a CCP clearing member or connected party spilling over, coupled 
with the inadequacy of pre-funded CCP resources to cover an open position, and (d) 
the risk of interconnectedness, which is heightened due to the levels of concentra-
tion of CCP services and operators at the global level.36 In addition, the fact that the 
CCP itself and or its members may be too-big-to-fail can heighten moral hazard. As 
regards the solvency of the CCP itself much currency is given to having a proper 
system for the attribution of losses to the non-defaulting members (loss waterfall), a 
functional resolution framework that will make the failing CCP resolvable, facilitat-
ing orderly failure, and establishing proper liquidity assistance arrangements with 
the central bank. But none of these methods is failproof.37
4.1  Funding Risks and Liquidity Shocks
Margin collections are, in general, a sound mechanism to contain microprudential 
(counterparty default) risk. Yet sometimes changes in margin requirements can 
induce destabilizing trading. Firms that have to meet large margin calls may respond 
by selling assets and by reducing positions in ways that exacerbate the price changes 
which triggered the margin calls in the first place. As explained earlier, while margin 
calls reduce overall trader leverage at the same time they place pressure on members 
to obtain cash or other liquid assets to meet the calls within a short timeframe. This 
can give rise to considerable funding strains, which can drain market liquidity as 
they lead to interest rate rises and borrowing limits. Worse, they can directly lead 
to destabilizing price movements if CCP members liquidate assets in haste in their 
scramble for liquidity to meet the calls.
Given CCPs’ ability to increase margin requirements with little notice such liq-
uidations can turn into downward price spirals, which can for behavioural reasons, 
including panic and risk aversion,38 lead to systematic discounting and uncontrol-
lable selling pressure. If solvent firms subject to margin calls have no other feasi-
ble course of action, because, for instance, a solvent CCP cannot meet immediate 
demands for the return of clearing member collateral, they will try to meet margin 
calls by resorting to firesales. These, in turn, impact the value of the balance sheets 
of all other firms holding similar assets in their portfolios. In this scenario margin 
calls become a classic example of a sound microprudential measure that can give 
rise to significant macroprudential risks.39 It is therefore arguable that central banks 
36 Financial Stability Board (2018).
37 For a critical overview see Cont (2015).
38 Avgouleas (2010).
39 Brunnermeier et al. (2009), pp 6, 7, 13, 14.
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could/should intervene in such a case to ease funding strains40 and especially to pre-
vent firesales,41 which would turn margin calls into a system-wide price shock and 
that, in turn, into a wave of defaults. But resorting to Central Bank funding does 
increase moral hazard and adverse selection incentives making the decision to sup-
ply public liquidity support to CCPs less than straightforward.
4.2  Member Failure and Inadequate Pre‑Funded Resources
In general, this type of risk refers to three types of failure. First, when a clearing 
member, identified as such at the clearing service level, defaults on its obligations. 
Such default exposes a CCP to credit and liquidity risks, because the CCP guar-
antees the fulfilment of obligations to surviving clearing members. If the CCP’s 
pre-funded resources prove insufficient, the CCP might resort to a firesale of collat-
eral it holds against the defaulting member to meet its liquidity and payment needs, 
eventually causing a firesales type of activity. Such actions exacerbate rather than 
contain a developing crisis due to the ensuing downward price spirals. Shortfalls in 
CCP pre-funded resources to meet exposures arising from a member’s default due to 
member free riding and under-provisioning are not an everyday scenario given the 
prudential controls on the levels of CCP pre-funded resources. But still they are not 
an utterly remote risk.
4.2.1  Margin Variations, Skin‑in‑the‑Game, Default Funds and the Loss Waterfall 
Mechanism
The presence of CCH’s ‘skin-in-the-game’ in the ‘default waterfall’ aligns to 
some extent shareholder incentives with those of CCH members. In the case of a 
clearing member (CM) default, the CCP will, first, use the defaulter’s Initial Mar-
gin and default fund contribution to cover the losses incurred (the defaulter pays 
approach),42 followed by a designated tranche of CCP capital, the so-called skin-in-
the-game amount. If this proves insufficient, then the default waterfall is activated. 
The default waterfall describes how losses are reallocated across non-defaulting 
CMs.43 Firstly, the pre-funded default fund contributions of non-defaulting CMs will 
be used to cover the losses. Secondly, the CCP has to deploy recovery tools, such as 
the replenishment of the default fund, by demanding liquidity from non-defaulting 
CMs. Third, if the pre-funded contributions to the Default Fund are insufficient to 
cover all remaining losses, clearing members are required to provide the CCP with 
additional financial resources, so-called assessments.
At this point the waterfall can pose problems, because there may be payment 
delays from CMs and secondly because CCP’s resilience is now exclusively depend-
ent on the CMs’ capacity to jointly bear losses given the replenishment of the default 
42 Pirrong (2011), p 43.
43 Elliott (2013), pp 5–8.
40 Dobler et al. (2016), pp 13–18, 21, 22.
41 Avgouleas (2016a), pp 46, 47.
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fund’s pre-funded resources and the skin in the game amount. In a distressed mar-
ket, CMs’ (lower) payment capability and (possibly) higher default probability may 
impact on their ability to raise (external) funding.44 Admittedly, in the case of some 
CCPs owned by very high-grade parent CCHs, the CCH or its parent company, 
which would naturally be worried about reputation contagion, could intervene at this 
point with their own equity and liquidity resources.45
Of course, the higher the ‘skin in the game’46 and the clearer is the resolution 
framework on the fate of shareholders’ equity in the event of CCP failure, the lower 
the moral hazard. CCP/CCH owners may lose something in the event of a CCP fail-
ure in spite of eventual public support. On the other hand, this does not entirely 
preclude shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour since there are many stages to an 
outright default and shareholders might have reaped the gains from profit earnings 
resulting from clearing riskier products for a long time.
4.2.2  Variation Margin Haircuts (VMGH), Contract Tear‑Ups, Initial Margin Haircuts
Other forms of containing the fallout from a CM failure are: variation margin 
haircuts (VMGH), contract tear-ups, initial margin haircuts and the Central Bank 
liquidity assistance discussed above. VMGHs allocate losses similarly to what would 
occur in a resolution, namely, the CCP distributes remaining losses by recourse to 
pro rata unpaid gains at the beneficial owner level. VGMHs come after the ‘loss 
waterfall’ has been exhausted.47 They allow for the continuity of clearing services 
and enable the CCP to avoid the irreversibility and costs associated with a full reso-
lution. VMGH can be efficient when losses arise from a large mark-to-market loss in 
instruments cleared by a CCP.48 However, they would not be sufficient when a mem-
ber defaults due to losses in assets not cleared by the CCP. VGMHs and contract tear 
ups may provide temporary relief to the CCP in a stress scenario to avoid a costly 
and irreversible resolution procedure, but the impact of this news on the market may 
be impossible to control.49
44 Tarullo (2015).
45 E.g., Eurex Clearing AG, which is the CCH that operates the Eurex Clearing CCP, is committed to 
provide additional financial resources as well, the so-called further dedicated amount. If this proves inad-
equate, Eurex Clearing’s equity capital is applied to cover any remaining losses. In addition, in an illus-
tration of the possible shortcomings of the ring-fencing of CCPs from the CCH, in the case of Eurex the 
Deutsche Börse AG which is the mother company of both the Eurex Clearing CCH and Deutsche Borse 
has issued a letter of comfort in favour of Eurex Clearing, according to which Deutsche Börse AG, the 
ultimate parent company, will provide Eurex Clearing with financial funding to enable Eurex Clearing to 
comply with its obligations once all other sources of funding have been exhausted thereby preventing the 
failure of the CCP. See EurexClearing, ‘Default Waterfall’, available at http://www.eurex clear ing.com/
clear ing-en/risk-manag ement /defau lt-water fall.
46 Carter and Garner (2015), pp 85–86.
47 ‘The CCP would impose a haircut on cumulative variation margin (“VM”) gains on the portfolio of 
trades of each beneficial owner which have accumulated over the days since the commencement of the 
default management process, i.e., day of the CM default giving rise to the Default Losses.’ ISDA (2013), 
p 4.
48 Ibid.
49 Cont (2015), pp 32–33.
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4.2.3  Contract Tear‑Ups
The possibility for the CCP to close certain unbalanced open positions provides a 
further backstop against continued losses. However, contract tear-ups result in a loss 
allocation across members which is not transparent ex ante and thus they do not pro-
vide clear incentives to clearing members. Also, they may appear as unfair ex post 
compared to a proper resolution procedure.
4.2.4  Initial Margin Haircuts
This is an uncommon recovery process under which the CCP (and/or the resolution 
authorities) uses funds serving as the initial margin of non-defaulted members to 
fund the CCP during recovery. Initial margin haircuts serve in this case in a similar 
fashion as the pre-committed member contributions to the Guaranty Fund thereby 
blurring the boundaries between the two. They can clearly increase/reduce mem-
bers’ exposures and distort member incentives. Essentially, a higher portion of non-
defaulting members’ funds is used to absorb the failure of the defaulting member 
to avoid CCP resolution. From the adverse selection point of view, it is much bet-
ter to increase ex ante the size of the Guaranty Fund, which, however, makes CCP 
membership more expensive and, thus, even more clustered around a small number 
of systemically important and globally systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs and G-SIFIs) heightening the risk of interconnectedness discussed below.
4.2.5  Provision of Central Bank Liquidity
While this should be a plausible part of the recovery phase to avoid the worst case 
scenario which is CCP resolution, it still sends a very strong message to the market 
(when it is eventually disclosed) that the CCP is in great difficulties, save the moral 
hazard concerns discussed above. In addition, where the CCP clears in multiple cur-
rencies or the CCP and its members are registered in different jurisdictions there 
may be important political and practical (currency) obstacles in offering such assis-
tance.50 Moreover, given that public money will be at stake in such a scenario, even 
pre-agreed multijurisdictional recovery and resolution plans might be torn apart 
on the day of reckoning without credit lines during recovery from multiple Central 
Banks or other sources. This is of course an important vulnerability in the execution 
of contemporary recovery and resolution frameworks for CCPs which engage in the 
clearing of cross-border and multi-currency trades.
50 E.g., the swap lines between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England which offer 
a vital liquidity backstop in connection with the clearing of euro FX trades on the London Clearing 
House have recently become the subject of much contended discussion, since the ECB intends to with-
draw these liquidity support lines after the UK’s exit from the EU. See Weber and Brush (2018). Among 
other powers the ECB demands in dealing with a crisis in ‘foreign’ clearinghouses is the power to ask 
such CCHs to increase collateral, limit cross-currency exposures, and shorten the intervals for their mar-
gin calls. Ibid.
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4.3  CCP Operation Risks
CCPs’ resilience is also threatened by a variety of operating risks. The first type 
of operation risks refers to the disruption of intraday liquidity and settlement lines 
which CCPs maintain with intraday liquidity providers to minimize the risk of 
liquidity shortages or bottlenecks in orderly clearing. Such disruption exposes a 
CCP to operational and liquidity risks as payments and settlements may be delayed. 
Disruption with a provider of its overnight and term credit and liquidity facilities, 
on the other hand, exposes, the CCP to liquidity risks that might push the CCP to 
temporarily default on its payment obligations even if it holds enough pre-funded 
commitments.
Moreover, even when the CCP holds sufficient pre-funded commitments these are 
normally utilised as cash or non-cash investments and the default of a counterparty 
to a repo agreement with the CCP or a borrowing party, including a deposit-taking 
bank, can give rise to liquidity and operation risks as regards non-cash investments 
and non-cash collateral portfolios holding such assets (e.g., government bonds) 
with third-party investment managers with the purpose of generating an investment 
return. The failure of investment service providers may also expose CCPs to credit, 
operating and liquidity risks.
The second key source of operating risks for CCPs is when the operation of cus-
todians, namely, firms that hold cash and securities collateral on behalf of CCPs and 
their members, is disrupted. Disruptions at a custodian firm exposes the client CCP 
to operational and liquidity risks, as the CCP may experience a delay in accessing 
its collateral and as the FSB notes: ‘in case of cash collateral, the CCP may also face 
credit risks’.51
The third major type of CCP operating risks is when the operation of settlement 
banks is disrupted. Banks process payments and trade settlements and collateral 
transfers between CCPs and their members. As the FSB notes: ‘[d]isruptions at a 
settlement bank expose a CCP to operational risk (and possibly also credit and intra-
day liquidity risk) as it experiences delays in fulfilling payment and settlement obli-
gations or transfers of collateral’.52
4.4  Risk Concentration and Interconnectedness
Risk concentration and its management is of course the key business of CCPs and it 
only becomes a concern when such centralisation becomes excessive due to mem-
bers’ adverse selection behaviour, a member failure, or a market-wide solvency or 
liquidity shock. But it also gives rise to visible and invisible ties of interconnect-
edness, which are heightened due to the concentrated nature of CCP services and 
operators at the global level.
51 Financial Stability Board (2018), p 6.
52 Ibid.
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An obvious concern is, for example, the fact that CCPs may be systemically 
important in more than one jurisdiction and that they maintain interdependencies 
with each other.53 They also develop very strong links with the rest of the financial 
system and especially systemically important and globally systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs and G-SIFIs) to which CCP members may belong, as a 
business division, or may be connected as affiliates or subsidiaries. In addition, CCPs 
maintain various relationships with other, non-member, financial institutions which 
may act as custodians, settlement banks, credit and liquidity providers and invest-
ment counterparties. Often a single entity maintains different types of relationships 
with different CCPs. As an example, a financial institution might be a member of one 
CCP, a custodian for a second CCP, while providing a credit line to a third CCP.54
According to the FSB the largest 11 of the 306 clearing members globally are 
connected to between 16 and 25 CCPs, which, essentially, means that the default of 
a CCP clearing member could result in defaults of the same entity or its affiliates in 
up to 24 other CCPs. In fact, through cross-memberships, the links of interconnect-
edness between CCPs and CCPs and members run even deeper.55 Risk concentra-
tion in the CCPs is manifested beyond the obvious measure of CCP exposures in 
the fact that prefunded financial resources are concentrated at a small number of 
CCPs. As the FSB notes, the two largest CCPs (as measured by prefunded financial 
resources) account ‘for nearly 40% of total prefunded financial resources provided to 
all CCPs’.56
As explained in Sect. 5 below, DLT-based clearing systems might, in fact, prove 
to be catalysts in alleviating global risk concentration levels within CCPs and, to 
some extent, interconnectedness by encouraging a more diverse financial ecosystem 
when it comes to risk concentration flashpoints. The final settlement of netted posi-
tions will take place in Central Bank money but such settlement could be delayed or 
funded by system resources thus covering the open positions of the defaulting party. 
Arguably, the rules of such distribution should be very strict to battle adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard.
5  Blockchain Technology for Derivatives Trading, Clearing 
and Settlement
5.1  Overview of the Issues
Transferring the clearing of securities and of certain types (either very standardised 
or highly complex) derivatives contracts to DLT platforms could only act as a way 
53 Financial Stability Board (2017e), pp 4–5.
54 Financial Stability Board (2018), p 4.
55 ‘[E]ven […] less highly connected CCPs often maintain connections to at least one highly connected 
entity that indirectly connects the CCP to the central (more interconnected) part of the network struc-
ture’. Ibid.
56 In fact this concentration factor has if anything worsened between 2016 and 2017 from 32 to 40%. 
Ibid.
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to alleviate the burden on CCHs (and their revenue and member rent extraction abil-
ity). It will also reduce some of the visible and invisible links of interconnectedness 
that have developed between the large financial institutions that act as clearing mem-
bers. This would both facilitate CCH/CCP resolvability and augment the resilience 
of the financial ecosystem especially in the context of derivatives markets. Realis-
tically DLT technology will be introduced in phases on an experimental and then 
pilot basis starting with more standardised OTC derivatives trading and clearing 
and eventually moving to the less standardised contracts. A recent FSB consultation 
paper identifies that while the centralisation of clearing and settlement was mostly 
conceived to draw bilateral OTC and non-standardised derivatives transactions in 
the latter case, CCPs have not made great inroads for contracts that are not subject 
to a mandatory clearing requirement. As the FSB notes ‘[s]ome categories of clients 
have less strong incentives to use central clearing and may have a lower degree of 
access to central clearing’.57 Clearly the introduction of multiple DLT-based systems 
will resolve the issue of access without compromising transparency.
It is of course likely that the DLT platforms will also offer an integrated trading 
service attached to clearing and settlement services leading to the further economi-
sation of transaction costs. This does not mean that CCPs will disappear or that they 
will cease to perform a valuable function. It means that clearing and settlement risk 
will become more diverse, less correlated and thus more manageable. It is not unrea-
sonable to speculate that network effects might divert especially more standardised 
OTC derivatives trading and clearing to specialised DLT platforms. And while the 
platform itself will operate on the basis of margin requirements including margin 
calls and a system treasury acting as a guaranty fund, liquidity management may 
be more efficient. In any case the less concentration of correlated risk in a single 
CCP there is, the less the risk that a member or customer failure will cause the cata-
strophic consequences that a failure of any of today’s CCPs may bring about.
5.2  Essential Properties of DLT‑Based Systems for Derivatives Clearing 
and Settlement
It is expected that new types of systems for derivatives clearing and settlement 
will use open source protocols (such as e.g., hyperledger58) to configure DLT func-
tionality and the type of smart contracts that users will exchange, which will have 
embedded in their code all rules for margin calls and variations, pricing updates etc., 
and will possibly communicate with regulatory rules/limitations as regards posi-
tion limits, and other controls on trader exposures etc.59 Given the importance of 
concealing trader identities, it is envisaged that nodes in the ledger will create and 
57 Bank of International Settlements, Financial Stability Board and IOSCO (2018), p 2.
58 Hyperledger is an open source collaborative effort created to advance cross-industry blockchain tech-
nologies. It is a global collaboration, hosted by The Linux Foundation, including leaders in finance and 
banking.
59 See White Paper, Project D-Chain, 19 December 2018, manuscript on file with the authors.
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use independent digital identities rooted in blockchains or other distributed ledg-
ers which will be interoperable across administrative domains and applications. In 
addition, privacy-preserving techniques that are suitable for distributed ledgers are 
expected to be particularly useful in our context.60
The first generation of DLT systems based on the Bitcoin protocol and its variants 
provide basic transaction services around a single asset: accounts can be spontane-
ously created, and assets can be transferred from one account to another. Some more 
enhanced functionality is offered in the form of ‘multi-sigs’ where it is possible to 
create joint accounts following some arbitrary threshold access structure. While this 
functionality covers basic entity to entity asset transfers and simple account manage-
ment, it is not sufficient for facilitating a robust market for OTC derivatives.
The second generation of DLT systems, such as Ethereum, provide a wider func-
tionality that is consistent with futures contracts. Given the ‘Turing-completeness’ 
of second generation DLT systems it is possible to code arbitrary transaction sys-
tems so that they operate on top of the ledger. Nevertheless, there exist a number of 
critical considerations that need to be taken into account for implementing a fully 
functional derivatives exchange. We explain next in more detail the basic functional-
ity that is required.
First, it is necessary to support a multi-asset environment that enables users to 
introduce new assets into the system and enable transfers between such assets. The 
transformation of an asset to a different one needs to be performed according to 
custom rules that should be specified by the issuer and may even be needed to be 
modified over time. An example of such a configuration between an investor and a 
broker is shown in Fig. 1. A critical feature here is that the multi-asset environment 
offered by the underlying DLT would be of most use if it allows the fluid interaction 
between all assets as opposed to a necessitated translation to a base native asset.
Assuming multiple assets and smart contracts, it is possible to facilitate margin 
accounts within a DLT environment. For simplicity, we will describe a scenario 
between a broker and an investor who wish to trade in derivatives for which a mar-
gin is maintained by the ledger from the outset with the investor aiming to acquire 
an amount of certain assets using some other assets as collateral. For the sake 
of simplifying our exposition let us assume that there is one asset to be acquired 
through an OTC forward contract, ‘coffeecoins’ (CC), and tokenised USD (T$) is 
used for the payment of the premium or for settling the contract and US Treasury 
Bills (TTBs$) are used as collateral.
Fig. 1  Counterparties engage with a blockchain-based DLT issuing smart contracts that interoperate
60 Examples of open DLT methods that provide enhanced privacy-preserving capabilities include 
ZChash, https ://z.cash and Monero https ://ww.getmo nero.org.
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We note that in both cases the tokenised assets could also be traded in the clas-
sical sense. In particular 1CC could be a pound of coffee of a specific type while 
translated into 1T$ it would be a tokenised form of fiat USD currency. In either case 
the tokenised forms will be backed up by an issuer that also provides a functioning 
exchange that continuously ensures a stable 1:1 rate between the tokenised form of 
the asset and its real-world counterpart. Tokenised forms of fiat currency such as 
those used in the pilot case of the CAD-Coin experiment, which was successfully 
conducted by the Bank of Canada in the early stages of project Jasper,61 can be used 
for clearing.
Accordingly, when two counterparties enter into a smart contract with respect to 
acquiring an exposure for future delivery/or cash settlement over an index, a com-
modity like CC, or another asset, the parties specify collateral in TTBs$ as well as 
prescribed obligations in terms of delivery for CCs and tokenized T$. The terms of 
such smart contract can be either determined fully off-chain and deployed on-chain 
with the understanding that it will be acceptable only in the case it conforms to the 
margin rules of the ledger, or they might be determined via a matching process that 
can also involve the ledger, with the parties posting relevant orders that are algorith-
mically matched by the ledger itself.
Once the contract is accepted by the ledger, which will require the margin rules to 
be satisfied, the smart contract becomes part of the margin accounts of the counter-
parties. Note that the value of the position is variable and depends on the exchange 
rate between CC and T$ which may also be extracted from blockchain data assum-
ing that the ledger records sufficient market information.
The new smart contract may impose various timing restrictions in terms of its 
activation in the interface of the counterparties, but invariably if the margin call is 
not heeded it will ultimately enter dissolution mode where it may be substituted by 
another contract, or a selling state in its internal logic where CCs are made available 
in exchange for T$. Various limitations can be imposed by the smart contract logic 
in terms of the ways the CCs can be traded. An important feature of the underlying 
DLT system is to inspect all outstanding contracts and attempt to net them en masse.
Referring to the example of Fig. 2, say party P is an investor acquiring CCs and 
Q is a broker that is responsible for the obligation to provide them. In such setting, 
Fig. 2  A schematic representation of the blockchain and the smart contract setting up a margin position 
corresponding to a commodity forward contract. Margin rules are set system-wide and enforced by the 
software logic of the transaction ledger
61 Chapman et al. (2017) Project Jasper.
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it is not only the investor that can interact with the smart contract and ask for liq-
uidating the CCs that are held by the contract. The broker may take action depend-
ing on the relative price between CCs and T$. Such action can be initiated by the 
broker by issuing special maintenance transactions to the smart contract. The smart 
contract may have a margin maintenance requirement and in such a case a margin 
call will be issued by the broker. The investor has to deposit T$ or TTBs $ to meet 
the call.
In the above description there are two features that are atypical for standard DLT 
technology. First, smart contract logic requires to process extensive information 
about the state of other smart contracts that are running concurrently in the ledger as 
well as transactions that were issued by the participants and their results.
The second requirement is the ability to process orders in a settlement fashion at 
regular intervals between smart contracts. The ideal setting is obviously one where 
orders are perfectly matched. Nevertheless, the market may find itself in states where 
no such perfect matching is feasible or even worse in a liquidity crunch with respect 
to a specific asset. In this case, the DLT system’s logic will have built-in mecha-
nisms for liquidity savings to ensure an optimal liquidation strategy that attempts to 
minimise systemic risk within the DLT-based derivatives clearing system.
The ‘nuclear’/ultimate resort option is to produce more assets of the required 
type as a way to meet the margin call or even, in a very limited number of cases, 
to settle the contract closing the position. In this case the system provides a tem-
porary overdraft of proprietary currencies issued by its treasury functionality. This 
may only be a very last resort liquidity management facility and would operate 
under very strict and agreed upon ex ante parameters, which will have been pre-
approved by either authorised validators or regulators themselves. For this rea-
son, the ledger will incorporate pre-approved parameters for the use of Treasury 
resources to temporarily cover an open position up to the point that a ledger par-
ticipant either finds his/her own resources to cover his/her open position/margin 
call or the position is liquidated in an orderly manner. Certain game theory doc-
trines will be incorporated in the code/algorithm62 to avoid a situation whereby, 
similar to the famous Arrow impossibility theorem,63 validators will not be able 
to reach Pareto efficient decisions vis-à-vis alleviating liquidity bottlenecks on the 
platform.
Interoperability with legacy infrastructure is another important dimension in this 
respect and that includes Central Bank-controlled payment systems. But given the 
willingness of major Central Banks like the Bank of England to accept blockchain 
payments to be connected with or even to be processed through their own systems 
this ought not to be seen as an insurmountable problem.64
62 E.g., Polemarhakis and Geanakoplos (1982).
63 Arrow (1951).
64 E.g., The Bank of England announced on 23 July 2018 that it had completed a Proof of Concept 
(PoC) to understand how a renewed Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) service could be capable of 
supporting settlement in systems operating on innovative payment technologies. Bank of England (2018). 
See also Carney (2018).
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6  Securities Trading and Settlement Using Blockchain Technology—
What Problems Would It Resolve?
6.1  Overview
With the advent of digitisation and dematerialisation the paper certificates previ-
ously held directly under the name of investors in the registers of securities issuers 
securities are now held indirectly through intermediaries offering depositary ser-
vices. These arrangements have generated serious rents for the intermediaries offer-
ing depositary/custodial services. As explained below the rents are twofold:
(a) Excessive intermediation and safekeeping fees and other costs. These are cal-
culated, according to some studies, to be between 6 and 13% of the trade value 
chains that include execution, settlement, custody and collateral management 
services65 and may reach up to 65–80 billion USD per year66;
(b) Multiple agency relationships throughout the chain between the investor and the 
investment intermediaries where conflicts of interest may arise and intermediary 
rents may multiply.67
There are also costs vis-à-vis the dilution of investors’ legal rights,68 a situation 
that is fully discussed below.
6.2  Investor Rights and Intermediated Securities
Under contemporary arrangements investors’ securities are held indirectly through 
intermediaries, namely, they have become ‘intermediated securities’.69 Investors 
merely receive statements about the value of their holdings70 and may still retain (or 
have duly delegated) the ‘intrinsic rights’ of the security (e.g., the right to vote, the 
right to receive a dividend) but their grip on the ‘substantive’ or otherwise propri-
etary rights with regard to title and other rights of enjoyment and the disposal of the 
security can become diluted in several ways.
Investors listed in the company registers used to be the legal owners of those 
securities, whereas investors holding through the custodial chain only have an equi-
table interest ‘in another equitable interest of another equitable interest of a legal 
65 The higher figure is based on a report by Wyman and SWIFT (2014), Exhibit 3, p 8 which found that 
revenue from settlement, custody and collateral management amounted to $40–45 billion in 2013. Both 
the higher and lower figure are mentioned in a Bank of England staff paper by Benos et al. (2017), p 4.
66 Mainelli and Milne (2016), p 8.
67 See on the rise of intermediary power and agency capitalism: Gilson and Gordon (2013); Judge 
(2015).
68 See Micheler (2017). Eva Micheler was, in fact, among the first to identify this and explain the ben-
eficial impact that DLT technology could have in this respect. See Micheler and von der Heyde (2016).
69 See Art. 1 of the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities. On interme-
diated securities and the legal challenges they raise see Gullifer and Payne (2010).
70 Micheler (2015), pp 506–507.
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interest’, a so-called ‘interest in securities’. Under English law’s concept of ‘no look 
through’ investors’ rights are indirect.71 Namely, they can only claim against the 
immediate custodian who can then claim through the chain of sub-custodians who 
hold the requisite rights on the security on trust and so on.
Setting aside the dispute as to whether equitable rights are indeed proprietary 
rights,72 inevitably the custodial chain dilutes both investors’ property rights and 
control over the use of their own assets that is now more or less delegated to the 
custodial intermediaries.
It is generally suggested that the ‘no look through’ approach facilitates liquidity 
especially as it makes it legally feasible to use the investor’s/client’s security as col-
lateral in the context of securities lending and repo transactions. Both types of trans-
action buttress short-selling activity in the markets thereby averting default and may 
lubricate the flow of margin in derivatives markets or secure liquidity in certain types 
of secured financing. While these contracts are arranged by the custodian, they are 
also a source of income for the asset owner/end investor who normally permits such 
use of the asset under the terms and conditions of the initial custodial agreement. But 
as the custodian chain becomes longer and the asset moves ever more remotely, in 
spite of requisite legal and regulatory controls,73 the eventual legal accumulation of 
third-party interests does affect the value of investors’ investments.74
6.3  Collateral Re‑use: Costs and Benefits
According to the FSB non-cash collateral ‘is “re-used” when a market participant, 
such as a bank, receives securities as collateral in one transaction and subsequently 
sells, pledges or transfers this collateral in a second transaction’.75 Collateral may 
be received by a market participant as a result of a variety of transactions, such as 
reverse repos, securities lending, margin lending and trades in over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives. If this collateral is eligible for re-use, the collateral taker can use 
it as collateral for other transactions. Collateral received may also be sold, creating a 
short position.76 Often these may involve collateral ‘pledged for reuse’ (rehypothe-
cation)77 whereby collateral takers have the right to re-use it in their own name. 
Its practical effect is economically equivalent to a title transfer (that is, a change 
in ownership) turning collateral into an instrument that is akin and equivalent to 
cash. In the pledged collateral market, any repo, securities lending, OTC derivatives 
(via a credit support annex) contracts and customer margin loans may involve a title 
transfer whereby the collateral provider transfers the ownership of collateral to the 
71 See Law Commission Project on Intermediated Investment Securities, Second Seminar: issues affect-
ing Account holders and Intermediaries, 23 June 2006, p 7.
72 The prevailing view, though, is that equitable rights under English law are proprietary. See on this 
Micheler (2015), pp 507, 523.
73 E.g., Client Assets sourcebook (CASS) 6.3.5 R FCA.
74 Micheler (2017).
75 Financial Stability Board (2017c), p 1.
76 Ibid.
77 Singh (2011), p 9.
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collateral taker. In return, the parties agree that once the collateral provider has dis-
charged its financial obligation to the collateral taker, the collateral taker will return 
equivalent collateral to the collateral provider. Equivalent collateral means securities 
of the same type and value not the original security.78
The supply of collateral in this form plays a critical role in monetary policy trans-
mission and may be used to expand credit/lending.79 On the other hand, there is 
a widespread view, mostly supported by the Financial Stability Board, that ‘rehy-
pothecation’ can create a liquidity illusion which may be fleeting in times of stress, 
as proved to be the case in the 2007–2008 period80 and may build obstacles to finan-
cial institutions resolution and insolvency because of the complex cross-ownership 
relationships that collateral re-use creates.81 Extensive rehypothecation can also be a 
source of systemic risk. In specific, it may:
(a) Lead to the accumulation of excessive leverage both at the individual entity and 
at the systemic levels;
(b) Increase interconnectedness in the financial sector, due to chains of transactions 
involving the re-use of collateral, reinforcing the risk of contagion, since one 
party’s default (a failure to deliver re-used collateral) can lead to a further chain 
of failures;
(c) Increase the sensitivity of market participants to counterparty (credit) risk, espe-
cially in stressed conditions;
(d) Act as a procyclical risk transmission mechanism intensifying especially liquid-
ity and solvency shocks;
(e) Amplify stress in the market, since a sudden drop in the value of widely held 
securities, which are re-used as collateral, will lead to substantial margin calls 
and higher haircuts, or even the exclusion of these securities from the pool of 
eligible collateral intensifying the liquidity and solvency strains facing market 
participants.82
6.4  DLT Benefits
The introduction of DLT platforms for securities trading and settlement will have 
dramatic consequences in several areas. According to a Bank of England study 
whose critical findings we uphold, the shift in trade and post-trade technology can 
bring the following benefits:
• Reduction in reconciliation and data management costs since processes will be 
simplified and automated83;
• Flexible settlement times;
78 Singh (2017), pp 6–7.
79 Singh (2017), p 7.
80 Financial Stability Board (2017b), p 7.
81 Ibid., pp 9–11.
82 Financial Stability Board (2017b), pp 7–9; Financial Stability Board (2017c), p 1.
83 See, in general, Santander Innovations, Wyman and Anthemis (2015).
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• The settlement risk will be drastically reduced if not eliminated;
• Automated clearing;
• Direct ownership instead of holdings of replacing intermediated securities;
• Traceability and transparency;
• Enhanced security and resilience.84
As explained above, DLT technology will facilitate the repatriation of control 
over traded securities where it belongs: the ultimate investor. This will result in an 
obvious reduction of legal and operational costs and would increase transparency, 
as investors could have direct access to their holdings and issuers could keep track 
of beneficial owners.85 It will also have a number of other consequences associated 
with such repatriation of control in addition to cost reductions.
Increased transparency in intermediary (asset managers’ actions) and thus 
accountability could even resolve some of the problems identified by Professor Kay 
in his review of UK equity markets vis-à-vis the behaviour of market professionals.86 
Such repatriation of control will give investors, particularly institutional investors, a 
direct say on how their securities are re-used, since it is beyond doubt that the prac-
tice will continue, to some extent, due to the fee income it generates. For example, in 
the case of pension funds and ethical and social market funds the fund trustees will 
have a much higher degree of control over the way managers permit their securities 
to be re-used, giving them the opportunity to reduce the availability of their collat-
eral for highly leveraged/highly speculative transactions.
Naturally, all movements of the tokenised security will be traceable in a DLT envi-
ronment. This also raises the possibility of protecting investor rights through the rehy-
pothecation chain by using specifically designed and industry approved (for its fidel-
ity) software. It is doubtful that such control will interfere with collateral transmission 
that is not placing investors’ collateral in jeopardy or with collateral transfers used to 
facilitate the transmission of monetary policy. Finally, it will augment the effectiveness 
of the electronic methods and tools suggested by the FSB to measure ‘collateral veloc-
ity’ (including measures of collateral re-use),87 spotting in a timely manner ‘financial 
stability risks arising from the re-use of collateral (e.g., interconnectedness, leverage 
and procyclicality)’ to inform any policy responses to addressing these risks.
6.5  Is the Introduction of DLT Technology in Securities Markets Feasible? Pace 
Jasper!
In spite of the above, doubts remain about several aspects of the use of DLT for 
securities trading clearing and settlement. Even if the technology is there to achieve 
84 Mainelli and Milne (2016), p 8 and p 69.
85 See Micheler and von der Heyde (2016).
86 The Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making, final report (July 2012), pp 
9-10, available at http://www.law.harva rd.edu/progr ams/corp_gov/long-term-value -creat ion-round table 
-2014-mater ials/kay-revie w_EX.pdf. Accessed 10 January 2019.
87 Financial Stability Board (2017c), pp 5 et seq., Appendix 1 and 2.
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the desirable rate of transactions per second, would system fidelity be so high as to 
preclude system failure and offer finality/certainty in securities trading, clearing and 
settlement? And if all these requirements are met is DLT more cost effective than 
legacy systems? While we will only know with certainty when the technology is put 
in widespread use the early signs are very encouraging. The challenges that are spe-
cific to the securities trading and post-trade environment have been summarised by 
the discussed Bank of England study as follows:
(a) The notary function which guarantees that the issued securities and any transfer 
of ownership are correctly recorded;
(b) The depository function: effective trading and clearing of securities via a shared 
ledger will require integrating the ledger with legacy assets;
(c) Delivery versus payment (DvP);
(d) Settlement finality;
(e) Legal ownership;
(f) Confidentiality;
(g) Identity management;
(h) Capacity to process a large number of trades at rapid speed (so-called Scalabil-
ity).88
The strongest evidence yet that it is possible for DLT technology to achieve all of 
the above is offered by the findings of the Canadian project Jasper III.89 The experi-
ment has shown that ‘that it is feasible to instantaneously clear and settle securities 
on-ledger’. In particular, the proof of concept allowed clearing and ‘delivery ver-
sus payment’ settlement immediately, demonstrating that it is possible to complete 
post-trade settlement on a DLT platform. Jasper II achieved a proof of concept solu-
tion that shows that it is possible to deliver payments in a way that has never been 
done before—by directly swapping cash from buyers to sellers, resulting in instant 
settlements.
7  Conclusion
While CCPs’ weaknesses in warehousing systemic risk may be a combination of 
structural flaws deeply ingrained in modern financial markets (e.g., interconnected-
ness) and market failures including business model flaws (e.g., adverse selection, 
inadequate pre-funded resources or skin-in-the-game), they still have served a use-
ful purpose. Yet DLT systems can increase both risk and position visibility (while 
88 Benos et al. (2017), pp 9–11.
89 Project Jasper is a collaborative project experiment conducted by Payments Canada, the Bank of 
Canada, TMX Group and Accenture to experiment with an integrated securities and payment settlement 
platform based on DLT. Jasper II is a continuation of earlier research work: Jasper I which examined the 
feasibility of the contested technology in the field of wholesale payments. It is a proof of concept experi-
ment that was delivered by Accenture, leveraging R3’s Corda DLT platform and explores the impact and 
potential benefits of DLT on broader Canadian financial market infrastructure.
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retaining market player anonymity) and cultivate a more diverse, and thus more 
capable to handle risk, ecosystem. In addition, increased investor control over their 
investments and enhanced post-trade transparency can curb leverage-fuelled exces-
sive speculation. Therefore, the right time has arrived for regulators and other pol-
icy-makers to stop fighting the last crisis and to open the gates to regulatory experi-
mentation, albeit, in the beginning, within a controlled environment. They should 
concentrate on how to foster the fidelity and reliability of DLT systems90 identifying 
(with industry’s help) the best ways to build an effective loss distribution mechanism 
within the ledger.
Moreover, the use of blockchain technology in FMI, following experiments and 
pilot projects to augment the fidelity of relevant platforms/systems, has a strong 
transformational potential both structurally and in terms of a reduction of social 
costs for the benefit of global financial stability and investor welfare. It can also 
prove genuinely transformative beyond FMI. First, the discussed change in the tech-
nological paradigm can also lead to a radical reduction of industry rents for the ben-
efit of end investors (supplies of finance) and end finance users increasing social 
gains at the expense of rent-seeking financial intermediaries. Second, the discussed 
change in the technological paradigm can create the right transparency, tradability, 
and liquidity conditions for long-term/committed finance to crowd out of the mar-
kets most of today’s short-term/speculative activity that is largely wasteful. Namely, 
the low cost of markets and FMI based on DLT technology and increased transpar-
ency may give rise to network effects when it comes to the creation of liquid markets 
for previously illiquid investments like real assets, long-term infrastructure debt, 
social enterprise funding, and equity stakes in innovative start-ups. It is reasonable 
to expect that, given the strong social pressures institutional investors face today, 
especially with respect to sustainability, the creation of low cost and liquid markets 
in these instruments can lead to a change in market attitudes towards responsible/
ethical/long-term patterns of investment.
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